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Article 5

Comment

New Restrictions
On Tax Shelter
Limited Partnerships
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Tax Reform Act of 1976,1 signed into law by President Ford
on October 4, 1976, is the culmination of more than two years of
work by both houses of Congress. The Act is the most 2extensive
tax reform effort since the enactment of the 1954 Code.
The changes made by the Act to the partnership provisions in
subchapter K are the first substantive changes in this area since
the subchapter's enactment as a part of the 1954 Code. It is clear
from the Act and the accompanying committee reports 3 that the
changes to Subchapter K were motivated by the wide use of tax
shelter limited partnerships which led Congress to believe that taxpayers abused some of the partnership provisions. Most of the
changes made to Subchapter K are of a restrictive nature applicable
to tax shelter limited partnerships.
This comment discusses the substantive changes contained in the
five subsections of section 213 of the Act. The first three subsections were intended to clarify issues which were uncertain under
prior law, relating to special allocations, retroactive allocations, and
guaranteed payments. The remaining two subsections narrow provisions of the prior law which were not unclear, but which had
been abused by taxpayers. These provisions deal with additional
first year depreciation and nonrecourse debt.
II. SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS
A.

Prior Law

The Tax Reform Act clarifies the Code's restrictions on a
partnership's allocation of various net income or loss items to
1. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
2. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 [hereinafter referred to in the text as the
Code].
3. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited
as HOUSE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; H. CON. REP. No. 94-1515,

PARTNERSHIP TAX
partners. Section 704 (a) 4 of the Code gives the partnership general authority to allocate income, gain, loss, deductions and credits
generated by the partnership among the partners in any manner
which the partners desire, by setting forth such allocation in the
partnership agreement. Section 704(b) 5 restricts this allocation if
the principle purpose of the special allocation is the avoidance or
evasion of tax. The restriction provides that any item of income,
gain, loss, deduction or credit will be allocated to a partner in
accordance with his distributive share of taxable income or loss of
the partnership, as described in section 702 (a) (9), for the taxable
year. Section 702 (a) requires a partner to account separately for
various items received from a partnership in computing his own
income tax for a year. These items are listed in sections 702 (a) (1)
through (8). Section 702(a) (9) is the taxable income or loss of the
partnership, exclusive of the section 702 (a) (1) through (8) items
requiring separate computation. Thus, section 702 (a) (9) is the
"bottom line" income or loss.
The operation of the restriction of section 704(b) can be clarified
with an example. Suppose the partnership agreement of the AB
Partnership provides that income or loss will be allocated equally
to partners A and B. However, all of the partnership's depreciation
deductions are to be allocated to A. Because depreciation is a
deduction of the partnership, section 704(a) apparently allows this
allocation, subject to the restriction of section 704(b). Suppose,
however, it is determined that the principal purpose of the allocation of depreciation to A was the avoidance or evasion of tax.0
Section 704(b) provides that in such a case, depreciation would also
be allocated in accordance with "bottom line" income or loss as
94th

Cong., 2d Sess.

(1976)

[hereinafter

cited

as

CONFERENCE

REPORT].

or PARTNERSHIP AGREEPENT.-A partner's distributive share
of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall, except as otherwise
provided in this section, be determined by the partnership agreement."
I.R.C. § 704 (a) (prior to enactment of the Act, supra note 1).
5.
DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE DETERMINED BY INCOME OR Loss RATIO.
-A partner's distributive share of any item of income, gain,
loss, deduction, or credit shall be determined in accordance
with his distributive share of taxable income or loss of the
partnership, as described in section 702(a) (9), for the taxable year, if-

4.

"EFFECT

(2) the principal purpose of any provision in the partnership agreement with respect to the partner's distributive
share of such item is the avoidance or evasion of any tax
imposed by this subtitle.
I.R.C. § 704(b) (prior to enactment of the Act, supra note 1.).
6. The substantive standard for making this determination is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 26-33 infra.
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described in section 702 (a) (9). In this case depreciation would have
to be allocated equally between A and B.
The uncertainty under the old law resulted from the fact that
section 704(b) refers to items of income and gain and provides that
if an item is allocated for the principal purpose of tax avoidance,
then that item will be allocated in accordance with "bottom line"
income described in section 702(a) (9).
Because section 704(b)
refers to items and because the remedial allocation is in accordance
with "bottom line" income or loss, some tax practitioners argued
that section 704(b) did not apply to an allocation of "bottom line"
income or loss, and therefore such income or loss could be allocated
in any manner whatsoever, even if the principal purpose of the
allocation were the avoidance or evasion of tax.
This view was not universally accepted by tax experts. In his
treatise on partnership taxation,7 Arthur B. Willis expressed the
opinion that section 704(b) was not authority for the proposition
that any allocation of bottom line income or loss was allowable.
He maintained that section 704(b) simply did not deal with the
problem. Willis suggested that the substance over form doctrine
could be used to attack an allocation of "bottom line" income or
loss which had as its principal purpose the avoidance of tax."
This argument has never been settled by court decision, although
it was raised by the taxpayer in Jean v. Kresser.9 There, one
partner had a net operating loss carryover which would expire if
not used in 1965. He asked the board of governors of the partnership to allocate all of the partnership's 1965 taxable income to him
to enable him to take advantage of the loss carryover. In subsequent years, all of the income would be allocated to the other partners until the 1965 income was in effect repaid. The Commissioner
asserted that the petitioner, another partner, must nevertheless
report his share of 1965 income in accordance with the original
partnership agreement. The petitioner argued that he did not have
to report any income from the partnership in 1965 because all of
it had been allocated to the other partners. He asserted that even
if the allocation were for tax avoidance, section 704(b) did not apply
to allocations of income or loss as defined in section 702 (a) (9).
The court did not handle this issue but instead held for the government on the grounds that the partnership agreement had not been
amended in accordance with section 761 (c),10 and that the alloca7. 1 A.

WILLIS, PARTNnsHiP TAXATION

8. Id. at 316-17.
9. 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
10. Id. at 1628-30.

(2d ed. 1976).

PARTNERSHIP TAX
tion was not a bona fide allocation of income but was made in the
nature of a loan.:" However, in a footnote,12 the court referred
to the taxpayer's argument as "troublesome" and apparently supported by the structure of the statute and the legislative history.13
B.

The Tax Reform Act Changes

The ability to allocate income and loss has not been litigated
since Kresser. However, when the drafters of the Tax Reform Act
wrote the partnership changes, they chose to foreclose the argument. Section 213(d) of the Act amends section 704(b) of the Code
to make it clear that the section 704(b) restriction does apply to
the allocation of "bottom line" income or loss. Section 704(b), as
amended, reads:
(b) DETERMINATION OF DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE.-A partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item
thereof) shall be determined in accordance with the partner's
interest in the partnership (determined by taking into account
all facts and circumstances), if(2) the allocation to a partner under the agreement of
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof)
does not have substantial economic effect.14
By placing "or item thereof" in parenthesis at the end of the
list including income and loss, it seems clear that section 704(b)
now applies to "bottom line" income and loss. Also, rather than basing the remedial allocation on section 702(a) (9) income or loss, the
remedial allocation is now based on the partner's interest in the
partnership as determined by all of the facts and circumstances.
The Senate report stated that the facts and circumstances include
partners' interests in profits and losses, if different from their interest in taxable income or loss, cash flow and rights to distribution
of capital upon liquidation. 15
11. Id. at 1630-32.
12. Id. at 1631 n.5.
13. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379, reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4785, 5021, reads as follows:
Subsection (b) ... provides that if the principal purpose of any provision in the partnership agreement dealing
with a partner's distributive share of a particularitem is to
avoid or evade the Federal income tax, the partner's distributive share of that item shall be redetermined in accordance
with his distributive share of partnership income or loss described in section 702 (a) (9) [i.e., the ratio used by the partners for dividing general profits or losses] . . . (emphasis
added).
14. LR.C. § 704(b), as amended by Act, supra note 1, § 213(d).
15. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 100.
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Both the House report and the Senate report clearly indicate
that section 704(b) should apply to overall allocations of "bottom
line" income or loss.'" The House version of the bill, however,
would have reallocated income or loss or items thereof in a slightly
different manner, in the event such reallocation was called for.
1 7
would have reallocated the distribution in accordThe House Bill
ance with the partnership's permanent method of allocating the
taxable income referred to in section 702(a) (9) or if there were no
permanent method, then in accordance with the partner's interest
as determined by all the facts and circumstances. 18 The Senate's
version of the bill, 19 which was enacted into law, dropped the permanent method of allocation as a standard. 20 The Senate report
explained that the permanent method of allocation standard was
deleted
because of the difficulty of defining the permanent meth21
od.
The House Bill also was different from the Senate Bill with
regard to the substantive standard which would trigger a reallocation under section 704(b). The House Bill provided that a reallocation would occur unless the partner receiving the special allocation
could establish that there was a business purpose for the allocation
and that no significant avoidance or evasion of a -tax would result
from the allocation. 2 2 The Senate Bill, which contained the
language that was enacted, provided that a reallocation would be
23
made if the allocation did not have substantial economic effect.
The Senate report noted that although the language in the House
and Senate bills was somewhat different, the intent of both was
essentially the same-each version sought to prevent the use of
16. "The committee believes that an overall allocation of the taxable income or loss for a taxable year (described under section 702(a) (9) )
should be subject to disallowance on the grounds of tax avoidance
or evasion in the same manner as allocations of an item of income
or loss." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3 at 126. "The committee believes
that an overall allocation of the taxable income or loss for a taxable
year (described under section 702(a) (9) ) should be subject to disallowance in the same manner as allocations of an item of income or
loss." SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 99.
17. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. H11859 (daily ed.
Dec. 4, 1975) (bill as originally passed in the House) [hereinafter
cited as HOUSE BILL].
18. Id. § 210(d).
19. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S13797 (daily ed.

Oct. 6, 1976) (bill as amended by the Senate) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE BILL].

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. § 210(d).
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 100.

HOUSE BILL, supra note 17, § 210 (d).
SENATE BILL, supra note 19, § 210 (d).

PARTNERSHIP TAX
special allocations for tax avoidance. 24 A footnote in the Senate
report indicated a concern on the part of the finance committee
that the language of the House Bill conceivably could be subject
to an interpretation which could cause disallowance of a special
allocation to a high-bracket taxpayer, even though the allocation
had a business purpose and economic substance..2 3 Such concern
arose from language in the House Bill that a reallocation must be
made if there were significant avoidance or evasion. An allocation
could result in a reduction of the total tax paid by all partners if deductions or losses were allocated to partners in higher tax brackets.
Such an allocation could have economic substance and a business
purpose, in which case the Senate clearly intended that it be permissible.
The use of the substantial economic effect standard probably
represents a codification of existing law, even though that language
did not appear in the original section 704(b). The standard in the
Code before amendment was avoidance or evasion of tax. The first
mention of substantial economic effect as a standard appeared in
the Senate report to section 704(b) of the 1954 Code.
Where, however, a provision in a partnership agreement for a
special allocation of certain items has substantial economic effect
and is not merely a device for reducing the taxes of certain partners without actually affecting their shares of partnership income,
then such a provision will be recognized for tax purposes. 26
Apparently, the Senate wanted to make clear that an allocation
would not be disallowed automatically merely because it had the
effect of reducing the income tax liability of one or more of the
partners.
The substantial economic effect standard appeared in the
treasury regulations promulgated under section 704(b). The regulations provided that the determination of whether the principal
purpose of a special allocation was the avoidance or evasion of tax
must be made from all of the facts and circumstances.2 7 The regulation then listed the following as being among the relevant circumstances:
(1) whether there is a business purpose for the special allocation;
(2) whether the allocation has substantial economic effect;
(3) whether related items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit from the same source are subject to the same allocation;
supra note 3, at 100.
25. Id. at 100 n.11.
26. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379, reprintedin [1954] U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEws 4785, 5021.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (2) (1956) (amended 1964),
24. SENATE REPORT,

CODE
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(4)
(5)
(6)

whether the allocation was made without recognition of
normal business factors and only after the amount of the
specially allocated item could reasonably be estimated;
the duration of the allocation; and
28
the overall tax consequences of the allocation.

The regulation stated that an allocation had substantial economic
effect if it might affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares
of the total partnership income or loss independent of tax consequences. The Senate report 2on the Act contained the same definition and cited this regulation.
Substantial economic effect was only one of six factors which
were listed by the regulation, and those factors were not to be
exclusive. In a 1970 Tax Court case, however, it became apparent
that substantial economic effect was the primary consideration. In
Stanley C. Orrisch,30 the Orrisch family and the Crisafi family
formed a partnership to purchase and operate two apartment
houses. The families agreed that beginning in 1966, all of the
partnership's deductions for depreciation would be allocated to the
Orrischs but income or loss before depreciation would be shared
equally. They further agreed that if any property was sold at a
gain, the depreciation which the Orrischs had received would be
"charged back" to their capital account. In other words, if the
Orrischs received $35,000 of depreciation deductions through the
allocation, they also would be allocated the first $35,000 of gain
on the sale of the buildings. The Commissioner determined that
this special allocation had as its principal purpose the avoidance
or evasion of tax. The Tax Court briefly considered the other factors listed in regulation section 1.704-1 (b) (2), and then turned to
the Orrischs' argument that the allocation had economic substance.
The court examined the allocation to determine whether it could
affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the partnership
income or loss independent of tax consequences. The court noted
that under the agreement, if the buildings were sold at a gain, the
amount of the depreciation taken by the Orrischs would be allocated to them. This would increase their capital account to the
amount of the Crisafis' capital account and any additional gain, as
well as the proceeds of the sale, would be equally divided. The
court concluded that in that situation economic substance could not
be shown.
The court said that it was necessary to examine the effect if
the buildings were sold for a loss. In order for there to be economic
28. Id.
29.

SENATE REPORT,

supra note 3, at 100.

30. 55 T.C. 395 (1970).

PARTNERSHIP TAX
substance, the Orrischs would either have to contribute money to
the partnership to equalize the disparity in capital accounts, or
receive less money on liquidation. The court found no evidence
covering this situation but felt that the parties contemplated an
even division of proceeds in either case. Thus, there was no
economic substance to the allocation and it was not upheld.
The Orrischs might have succeeded had the partnership agreement been drafted more carefully. The special allocation was made
by oral agreement, thus the taxpayers could not prove the economic
effect. The fact that the sale proceeds were to be divided evenly
if the buildings were sold for more than the original cost should
not have been fatal had the agreement shown that the proceeds
would not be divided evenly if the buildings were sold for less than
their original cost. If the buildings were sold for more than their
adjusted tax basis but less than their original cost, there would
be a tax gain, but an economic loss. After adding back the tax
gain to the Orrischs' capital account, their capital would be less
than the Crisafis'. Had the agreement provided that the sales proceeds would be distributed pro rata to capital account balances, the
Orrischs would have received less than the Crisafis and economic
substance would have been established. Further analysis of the
intricacies of special allocations of depreciation deductions is beyond
the scope of this article.3 1
After Orrisch, substantial economic effect generally was considered to be the main standard by which a special allocation was
32
to be judged. In the recent Tax Court case of Leon A. Harris,
a special allocation of loss was found to have substantial economic
effect. In Harris, a partnership sold an interest in a shopping
center at a loss and allocated the entire loss to one of its partners.
The Commissioner asserted that the principal purpose of the allocation was the avoidance or evasion of tax and disallowed the allocation. The Tax Court upheld the allocation, emphasizing that it
obviously had economic effect.
Furthermore, of critical significance is the obvious "economic
effect" of the allocation agreement. Petitioner received the cash
proceeds of the sale; the loss allocated to him was applied to
reduce his capital account, and his share of the related items of
future profits, losses, and
proceeds in the case of liquidation was
33
reduced proportionately.
31. In depth analysis of this subject can be found in 283

TAX MNGM'T

(BNA) A-10 (1973) and Lee, The Partnership "Special Allocation":
When Will It Be Upheld: Orrisch Analyzed, 43 J. TAx. 138 (1975).
32. 61 T.C. 770 (1974).

33. Id. at 786.
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Now that the substantial economic effect test has been codified
in section 704 (b), Orrisch and Harris should have even more precedential value. The Senate report noted that "allocations of special
items and overall allocations should be restricted to those situations
where the allocations have substantial economic effect, as presently
interpreted by the regulations and case law."3 4 Regulation section
1.704-1 (b) (2) gives some examples of allocations which have substantial economic effect. Example two provides that an allocation
to one partner, who is a resident of a foreign country, of a percentage of the partnership's income from that country which is higher
than his overall income allocation percentage has economic effect.
This example is clear if the partner receives the money or has it
credited to his capital account. In example three, it is permissible
to allocate to one partner all of a partnership's tax exempt municipal bond interest and to the other partner all of the stock dividends
received. Clearly these allocations affect the amount of income the
partners will actually receive from the partnership. However, if
one partner got the first $10,000 of bond interest and the other
partner got the first $10,000 of dividends and after that all income
was divided equally, the example says the allocation would be only
of tax effects, as both partners would receive the same amount of
income. That, of course, is only true if interest and dividends each
exceed $10,000. Example four states that it is permissible to allocate asset appreciation which occurred prior to the entry of a new
partner, entirely to the old partners. This would reflect the
economic situation which would exist if the partnership sold its
assets immediately prior to the admission of the new partner. Example five states that where one partner provides most of the
capital, it is permissible to allocate all of certain expenditures to
that partner, because the expenses so allocated are in fact borne
by that partner. This example requires the assumption that the
expenses were charged to the partner's capital account, in order
for them to be "borne" by that partner. It is clear that these obvious examples in the regulations provide little in the way of explanation of economic effect.
How will the substantial economic effect test be applied to allocations of "bottom line" income or loss? It may be useful to work
through an example similar to the facts of the Kresser case. Assume
A and B are equal partners with capital accounts of $100 at the end
of 1976. In 1977, they agree to allocate all of the partnership's taxable income to A, so he can offset a separate loss he incurs that
year. They further agree that in future years, all income will be
34.

SENATE REPORT,

supra note 3, at 99-100.
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allocated to B, until he receives as much as A received in 1977,
but A does not guarantee that B will ever receive this income. The
agreement further provides that if the partnership is liquidated at
any time, the liquidation proceeds will be distributed in the ratio
of the capital accounts. In 1977, the partnership has taxable income
of $20, all of which is allocated to A, but each partner withdraws
$10 from the partnership. The capital accounts would appear as
follows:
A
B
1/1/77
$100
$100
20
1977 income
Cash withdrawal
[10]
[10]
12/31/77
$110
$ 90
Now assume that in 1978 the partnership again has $20 of
taxable income which, pursuant to the agreement, is allocated to
B. Again each partner withdraws $10.
A
B
1/1/78
$110
$ 90
1978 income
20
Cash withdrawal
[10]
[10]
12/31/78
$100
$100
The allocation then has had no economic substance because as of
December 31, 1978, each partner has withdrawn the same amount
of cash, and each has the same capital account balance. However,
assume the partnership is liquidated at December 31, 1977. A and
B each have contributed the same amount of cash and have withdrawn the same amount of cash, yet, as a result of the special allocation, upon liquidation A would receive 55 percent (110/200)
of the proceeds and B would receive 45 percent (90/200). Clearly
B has economically borne the cost of the allocation and A has
economically benefited. The same result would occur if the partnership continued in existence but never made enough profit to
compensate B for the special allocation in 1977.
It seems that this allocation would be disallowed by the
Commissioner under the rationale of Kresser. 35 It is far from
clear, however, that the definition of economic effect in the regulation and in the Senate report supports such a disallowance:
"[W]hether the allocation may actually affect the dollar amount
35. 54 T.C. at 1631-32. It is possible to speculate from the opinion that
the allocation might have fared better if the taxpayer would have
proved that there was no guarantee the amount would be repaid to

the other partners.
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of the partners' shares of the total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences . ... ,,36 The key word in the
definition is "may." The word implies that the allocation would
not necessarily have to affect the actual dollar amounts in all cases.
Under some set of facts, however, it must be possible for the allocation to affect the actual dollar amounts. That seems to be the
exact situation contemplated by the example. The allocation may
in some cases affect dollar amounts. Such a case would be where
the partnership is liquidated before sufficient income has been allocated to B to compensate him for the income allocated to A in 1977.
A court will almost surely find a way to disallow this allocation.
It can find some help by considering the other factors listed in
Treasury Regulation section 1.704-1(b) (2). Factors such as business
purpose and the duration of the allocation add support to the disallowance of the allocation. Even though the economic effect test
now has been codified, the Senate report appears to lend authority
for continuing to consider the other factors. "Other factors that
could possibly relate to the validity of an allocation are set forth
under the present regulations [Regulations section 1.704-1 (b) (2)].
S. .- In conclusion, the Act may not have changed the existing
law on special allocations. The Senate report specifically states
that no inference should be drawn as to the validity of a special
allocation under present law. 38 However, the Internal Revenue
Service seems to have stronger weapons in its arsenal under section
704(b) to attack certain special allocations in the future.
III. RETROACTIVE LOSS ALLOCATION TO NEWLY
ADMITTED PARTNERS
A.

Prior Law

Section 213(c) of the Tax Reform Act clarifies another area
which had been uncertain under prior law. The retroactive loss
allocation was used by tax shelter limited partnerships to lure new
investors near year end. This opportunity arises frequently in the
case of a high bracket taxpayer who may not know until near the
end of his taxable year what his tax liability for the year will be.
Thus, wealthy investors frequently look for tax shelter investments in December, when they realize that they face a substantial
income tax liability. A limited partnership involved in oil or gas
exploration may have generated a large tax loss over the course
36. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 100; Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)

(1956) (amended 1964) (emphasis added).
37. SENATE REFoRT, supra note 3, at 100.
38. Id. at 100-01.

(2)

PARTNERSHIP TAX
of the year by deducting intangible drilling expenses. Similarly,
a real estate partnership may have generated a tax loss by deducting construction period interest and taxes. To lure investors, the
partnership might agree to allocate to a new partner a full share
of the partnership's loss for the entire year even though he entered
the partnership in December. If the partnership was highly leveraged, as many are, the loss allocated to the investor often would
exceed the amount of his investment.39
The tax status of the retroactive loss allocation has not been
clear. The argument against it has come from section 706(c) (2) (B)
which provided:
(B) DisposiTioN OF LESS THAN ENTIRE nTEREsT-The taxable
year of a partnership shall not close (other than at the end of
partnership's taxable year as determined under subsection (b) (1))
with respect to a partner who sells or exchanges less than his
entire interest in the partnership or with respect to partner whose
interest is reduced, but such partner's distributive share of items
described in section 702(a) shall be determined by taking into
account his varying interests in the partnership during the taxable
year. 40
The argument against the allowance of a retroactive allocation is
that when a new partner is admitted, the existing partners' interests are reduced, and under section 706 (c) (2) (B) they must account
for their distributive shares of items of income and loss by taking
into account their varying interests throughout the year. It would
thus be logical that the new partner also would have to account
for his share of items of income or loss by taking into account the
amounts of such items which were incurred during that part of
the year he held his interest. Thus, a retroactive allocation of loss
would not be possible.
Several arguments were used to support the retroactive loss
allocation. It was argued that because section 702(a) applied only
to items of income or loss, section 706(c) (2) (B) did not apply to
an overall allocation of taxable income or loss. It was further
argued that the admission of a new partner did not necessarily
result in a reduction of the interests of the other partners. For
example, assume that A and B are equal partners of the AB partnership which has a net worth of $50,000. A and B each have
a $25,000 capital account. If C is admitted as a one-third partner
39. Under prior law, if a limited partnership borrowed money on a nonrecourse basis, a limited partner could include part of the debt in the
basis of his interest thus enabling him to deduct losses in excess of
his actual investment. See text accompanying notes 112-123 infra.
40. I.R.C. § 706(c) (2) (B) (prior to enactment of the Act, supranote 1).
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for a $25,000 capital contribution, A's and B's interests are reduced
from 50 per cent to one-third each. However, the partnership's net
worth is now $75,000, so A's and B's reduced percentage interests
are still worth $25,000 each. If interest is interpreted in dollar
terms, they have not suffered a reduction, so section 706(c) (2) (B)
should not apply. Even if section 706(c) (2) (B) did apply, it was
argued that it could be circumvented by the partnership agreement.
Section 704(a) stated that except as otherwise provided by section
704, a partner's distributive share of income or loss would be as
provided in the partnership agreement. The section 704(b) limitation against allocations having as their principal purpose the avoidance or evasion of taxes would not apply, the argument went,
because section 704(b) did not apply to overall allocations of taxable income or loss. 4 1 The partnership agreement's distribution
of taxable income or loss was not overidden by section 706 because
the only limitation placed on section 704(a) was that of section
704(b). Furthermore, section 761(c) provided that the partnership
agreement included any amendments made prior to, or at, the time
prescribed by law for filing the partnership tax return. Thus, a calendar year partnership could amend its agreement on, or prior to
April 15, 1977, to allocate 1976 losses to a partner admitted in December of 1976.42
A different situation prevails if a new partner buys the entire
interest of another partner. In this situation, section 706(c) (2) (A)
applies and requires that the retiring partner's share of income and
loss items be determined for the period ending with the sale. The
regulations under section 70643 provide that the partnership may
close its books on the date of the sale, or may prorate the amount
of the items which the retiring partner would have taken into
account had he remained a partner throughout the remainder of the
taxable year. Such proration may be based upon the time which
the retiring partner has held his interest, or by any other reasonable
method. That regulation further provides4 4 that the transferee of
41. See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra. Of course, the argument that
§ 704(b) does not apply to overall allocations of taxable income or
loss is now refuted by the change Act, supra note 1, § 213 (d) made
in I.R.C. § 704(b).
42. For discussions of and conclusions about the arguments for and against
the retroactive allocation of losses prior to the Act, see 1 A. WILIs,
supra note 7, at 281-94; McGuire, Retroactive Allocations Among
Partners: The Rodman Decision, 52 TAxES 325 (1974); Lee & Parker,
Retroactive allocations to new Partners: An analysis of the area after
Rodman, 40 J. TAx. 166 (1974); 282 TAx MNGM'T (BNA) A-28 (1973).

43. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1 (c) (2) (ii) (1956) (amended 1973).
44. Id,
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the interest will include in his income the pro rata amount of the
items allocated to him as determined by the method of allocation
used. Thus, where a new partner is admitted by the purchase of a
retiring partner's entire interest, there is more authority that a
retroactive allocation to the new partner is not permissible. However, the argument could still be made that items of income or loss
do not apply to overall taxable income or loss, because section
706 (c) (2) (A) refers to items described in section 702 (a). Arguably,
section 704(a) would still permit the partnership agreement to override section 706 (c) (2) (A) and regulations section 1.706-1(c) (2) (ii).
Only one case squarely confronted the question of retroactive
allocations to newly admitted partners. 45 In Norman Rodman,4 C
a partnership was comprised of four partners, each having a 25 per
cent interest. The partnership reported on the calendar year. On
November 2, 1956, Walter Ornstein, one of the partners, sold his
25 per cent interest to the remaining three partners. On November
5, 1956, the three remaining partners sold Martin Rodman a 22 per
cent interest in the partnership. From November 5 to the end of
the year, the other three partners' interests were 331/, 22%,
and 22 per cent. Clearly, those three partners' interests had.
changed throughout the year, and at least two of the three had
their interests reduced by the entry of Rodman. The partnership
tax return for 1956 showed a loss and a full 22 per cent of the
loss was allocated to Martin even though he had only been a partner for less than two months. Martin reported 22 per cent of the
partnership's loss on his individual return. The Commissioner
disallowed $900,000 of basis claimed by the partnership in some
stock it had sold during the year. This caused the previously
reported loss to become income, of which 22 per cent was attributed
to Martin by the Commissioner. Before the Tax Court, Martin
argued that the intent of the partners was that Martin receive only
22 per cent of the income from November 5 to the end of the year.
This argument was inconsistent with the position taken on his
income tax return when he thought the partnership had a loss. The
Commissioner pointed this out 4 7 and the Tax Court agreed with
45. Smith v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1964) and Town & Country
Plymouth, Inc. v. United States, 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5823 (C.D. Cal.
1967) are sometimes discussed in conjunction with retroactive loss allocations. However, Smith involved a retroactive allocation to a partner who had been a member of the partnership for its entire taxable
year, and because of the fact that Town and Country was only unofficially reported, it is difficult to tell from the report exactly what the
case stands for.
46. 42 T.C.M. (P-H) 1258 (1973).
47. Id. at 1270.
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the Commissioner. The court held that section 706(c) (2) (A)
required that income be allocated to Ornstein for January 1 to
November 2, 1956, when he was a partner. However, a full 22
per cent of the remaining income was allocated to Martin. Thus,
the court apparently ignored the requirement of section 706(c)
(2) (B) with respect to the three remaining partners, because they
did not determine their shares of the income by taking into account
their "varying interests in the partnership during the taxable
year. ' 48 The court apparently held that section 704(a) allowed
the partners to fix their shares of income in the partnership and
section 761 (c) provided that the partnership agreement included
any modifications made prior to, or at, the time prescribed for filing the partnership return. 49 Thus, the November 5, 1956, agreement admitting Martin to the partnership could allocate to him
a full 22 per cent of the income remaining after Ornstein's share
was allocated to him.
Even though it is not surprising that the government would
argue to recognize a retroactive allocation when the taxpayer's taxable income would be increased, it is somewhat surprising that the
government did not seem to realize the potential for taxpayers to
use retroactive allocations of losses. In the government's brief, it
apparently did not argue for a retroactive allocation. It argued
that even though Martin was allocated 22 per cent of the income
for the entire year, all income allocated to him was earned after
his admission to the partnership. If 22 per cent of the income for
1956 had not been earned after November 5, such an allocation
would violate assignment of income principles. 50
After Rodman, some commentators took the position that a new
partner retroactively could be allocated shares of losses incurred
before his admission. Some even suggested that the partners could
agree not to allocate any income or loss to a retiring partner, as
required by section 706(c) (2) (A). 5 1 Reliance on this memorandum decision, where the government argued for non-retroactive
allocation of income, as authority for a taxpayer to make a retroactive allocation of loss, should cause even the most experienced
tax practitioner to lose sleep!
The decision in Rodman was appealed to the Second Circuit,
which decided the case on September 17, 1976.52 The Second Cir48. I.R.C. § 706 (c) (2) (B).
49. 42 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1269-70.
50. See McGuire, supra note 40, at 325-26; 282
(Changes and Additions §§ 5-6) (1976).
51. See Lee &Parker, supra note 42, at 168.
52. Rodman v. Comm'r, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976).
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cuit held that Martin could be allocated only 22 per cent of the
partnership's income which was earned after his admission to the
partnership. The government apparently had realized the danger
of its argument before the Tax Court because it conceded that the
court had erred in allocating 22 per cent of the full year's income
The Second Circuit said that a retroactive allocation
to Martin.5
54
violated the assignment of income doctrine of Helvering v. Horst.
The allocation also ran afoul of the section 704 (b) (2) rule that an
allocation will not be recognized if it has as its primary purpose
the avoidance or evasion of tax. The court also found the allocation violated section 706 (c) (2) (B) which required the partners
whose interests were reduced by the entry of Martin to account for
their share of income in accordance with their varying interests throughout the year.55 Thus, the partnership agreement could
not override the provisions of section 706 (c) (2) (B).
A footnote in the Second Circuit's opinion is particularly disturbing. 56 Both Martin and the Commissioner claimed that
Martin's share of the 1956 income should be determined under regulations section 1.706-1(c) (2) by multiplying the partnership's income by Martin's 22 per cent interest and then making a proration
of that amount based on the number of days Martin held his interest (57/366). Rather than accept that computation, the Second Circuit noted that a straight daily proration would result in a prohibited income assignment to Martin if a substantial portion of the
partnership's income accrued prior to Martin's entry. The court
remanded to the Tax Court to determine if such an assignment
had occurred or if a simple pro rata allocation was appropriate.
This appears to be a failure by the court to recognize the very purpose of the regulation, which is to allow time allocations so that
the partnership does not have to compute precisely how much income had been earned prior to the retirement of a partner. The
regulation specifically permits a time allocation.
Technically, regulations section 1.706-1(c) (2) would not apply
to this situation. It only applies to an allocation between a partner
who disposes of his entire interest and the transferee of that interest. In Rodman, Ornstein disposed of his entire interest to the
remaining three partners, not to Martin. Martin purchased his
interest from the other three partners. Regulations section 1.7061 (c) (4) would apply to this transaction. It provides only that the
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 857.
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
542 F.2d at 858.
Id. at 859 n.19.
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three remaining partners must report their share of income in accordance with their varying interests. It has no specific provision as
to an allocation to Martin, however, it would be logical to use the
same time allocation permitted when a partner disposes of his entire
interest. The particular situation in Rodman could also be constructively viewed as a sale of an interest by Ornstein to Martin,
because on November 2, Ornstein sold a 25 per cent interest to the
other three partners and three days later, they sold a 22 per cent
interest to Martin. The court nowhere mentioned that section
1.706-1(c) (2) of the regulations was inapplicable. Because both
parties argued for the same allocation the court should have
accepted the rationale outlined above.
B.

The Tax Reform Act Changes

Although section 213(c) of the Act was drafted before the
Second Circuit decided Rodman, the Act reaches much the same
result as did the Second Circuit's Rodman decision. The Act
amends section 706(c) (2) (B) to read as follows:
The taxable year of a partnership shall not close . . .with respect
to a partner who sells or exchanges less than his entire interest
in the partnership or with respect to a partner whose interest is
reduced (whether by entry of a new partner, partial liquidation
of a partner's interest, gift, or otherwise), but such partner's dis-

tributive share of items described in Section 702 (a) shall be determined by taking into account5 7 his varying interest in the partnership during the taxable year.
The new law adds the material in italics to make it clear that
the section applies to the situation where a partner's interest is
reduced by the admission of a new partner. Although the section
still does not refer specifically to the treatment of the new partner,
logic dictates that his share of income or loss must also be computed
by considering the portion of the year which he held his interest.
To make it clear that this section cannot be circumvented by
the partnership agreedment, section 704(a) also was amended to
read: "A partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter
be determined by the partnership agreement. '5 8 Previously, the
word "section" appeared where "chapter" now appears. The House
Bill contained the word "subchapter"5 9 and the Senate report
refers to "subchapter."'6 0 Apparently the inclusion of "chapter"
57. I.R.C. § 706(c) (2) (B), as amended by Act, supra note 1, § 213(c)

(emphasis added).
58. I.R.C. § 704(a), as amended by Act, supra note 1, § 213 (c).
59. HouSE BILL, supra note 17, § 210 (c).
60. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 98.
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instead of "subchapter" was an oversight, but the clear intent was
that the partnership agreement not override any of the partnership
provisions contained in Subchapter K as to the determination of
the partner's distributive shares. 61
Congress apparently saw no need to amend section 706(c) (2) (A)
to cover the -situation where one partner sells his entire interest
to a new partner, because regulations section 1.706-(1) (c) (2) clearly
would apply to the new partner. Section 704(a) now makes it clear
that the partnership agreement cannot circumvent section 706.
Nonetheless, section 706(c) literally still refers to "items" as
described in section 702(a). One could still argue that the section
does not apply to overall taxable income or loss (the same argument
that was applied to section 704(b) before amendment), however,
in light of Rodman and the clear legislative intent, that argument
surely would not prevail. Nonetheless, the amendment to section
706 is very poorly drafted.
The Senate report says that regulations are to apply the same
methods of proration under section 706(c) (2) (B) as now are applied
under section 706(c) (2) (A) 62 by regulations section 1.706-1(c) (2).
Section 706(c) (2) (A) specially authorizes regulations for making an
allocation. However, section 706(c) (2) (B), even as amended is still
silent on this point. Only the Senate report provides authority
for thi application of regulations section 1.706-1(c) (2) to cases
where section 706(c) (2) (B) is applicable.
Because the regulation allows either an interim closing of the
partnership's books or a proration, various planning possibilities are
still available. Assume the ABC partnership is comprised of
partners A, B, and C who each have a one-third interest in capital
and taxable income or loss. For calendar year 1977 the partnership
incurs a taxable loss of $1,000. Assume further, that on July 1,
A, B, and C each sell to D and 8% percent interest, so that from
July 1 to December 31, A, B, C, and D each owns a 25 per cent
interest. Section 706 (c) (2) (B) clearly applies, and according to the
Senate report, so does regulations section 1.706-1(c) (2). If $200 of
the loss was incurred prior to July 1, it would be to D's tax
advantage to close the books on June 30. In this manner D is allocated 25 per cent of the $800 loss which was incurred after June
30, or $200. A straight time allocation would allocate half of the
$1,000 loss to the time D was a partner, giving him 25 per cent
of $500, or $125. Therefore, D is allocated $75 more of loss if the
partnership closes its books on June 30. If $800 of loss had been
61. Id.
62. Id.
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incurred prior to July 1, closing the books on June 30 would give
to D 25 per cent of the $200 loss incurred after June 30, or $50.
A time allocation would again give D $125, so in this situation the
time allocation allocates to D $75 more loss.
A cash basis tax shelter partnership apparently could postpone
the payment of deductible expenses until late in the year. It could
admit new partners on December 1 and close its books that day.
By paying the expenses in December, the new partners would
receive the benefit of the deductions."" This could be attacked only
by constructively putting the partnership on the accrual method
of accounting for purposes of making the interim closing of the
books. The Senate report appears to sanction this type of tax
planning:
These rules will permit a partnership to choose the easier method
of prorating items according to the portion of the year for which
a partner was a partner or the more precise method of an interim
closing of books (as if the year had closed) which, in some instances will be more advantageous where most of the deductible
expenses were paid or incurred upon 64or subsequent to the entry
of the new partners to the partnership.
The footnote in the Second Circuit's Rodman opinion 5 may
cast some doubt on the ability of taxpayers to use time allocations
where they would be more advantageous. The language of regulations section 1.706-1 (c) (2) and of the Senate report, however,
clearly appears to allow such allocations, so they should be
respected.
In summary, to the extent a partnership can incur deductible
expenses late in the year, it appears as though results similar to
a retroactive allocation to new partners can still be obtained.
IV.

GUARANTEED PAYMENTS

A. Prior Law
Section 213(b) of the Tax Reform Act, which is also intended
to clarify prior law relates to the treatment by the partnership
of guaranteed payments to partners, and organizational and syndication fees. These items frequently arise together in tax shelter
63. Other sections of the Act may limit the effectiveness of this technique
by disallowing some of the deductions which were previously used
to create tax losses. For example, Act § 201 requires that construction
period interest and taxes on real property be capitalized and amortized.
64. SENATE REPosr, supra note 3, at 98.
65. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
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limited partnerships where the partnership agreement provides for
guaranteed payments to the general partner for items which are
classified as organizational expenses.
It has not been clear under the 1954 Code whether organizational
expenses could be deducted by the partnership. There has not been
a provision comparable to section 248, which applies to corporations. 66 A provision in the House version of the Trust and
Partnership Income Revision Act of 196007 would have allowed
partnerships somewhat similar treatment. This provision was
deleted by the Senate, however, and the entire bill was killed in
committee.
Even without a specific section governing the treatment of
partnership organizational costs, section 26368 appears to apply.
This section, as interpreted by the regulations, 9 generally would
disallow the deduction of any amount expended to acquire property
having a useful life substantially beyond the tax year. The
unresolved question has been whether the capitalization requirements of section 263 were overridden by the guaranteed payment
provisions of section 707(c).70 The argument was that if an expen66. I.R.C. § 248 provides that a corporation may elect to amortize its organizational expenses ratably over a period of not less than 60 months.
In order to qualify for amortization under § 248, the expenditure must:
(1) be incident to the creation of the corporation; (2) be chargeable
to capital account; and (3) be of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of a corporation having a limited life, would be
amortizable over such life. Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(b) (1956), gives examples of amortizable expenditures, such as legal services incident to
incorporation, accounting services, state fees, and costs of holding and
attending organizational meetings. The regulation specifically prohibits the amortization of expenses connected with the issuance of
stock or securities, expenses connected with the transfer of assets to
a corporation, or expenses of a reorganization.
There was no counterpart to § 248 prior to the enactment of the
1954 Code and case law prohibited deduction of organizational expenses. Clarence Whitman & Sons, Inc., 11 B.T.A. 1192 (1928); Blumberg Brothers, Co., 12 B.T.A. 1021 (1928).
67. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
68. "No deduction shall be allowed for-(l) Any amount paid out for
new buildings or for permanent improvements on betterments made
to increase the value of any property or estate." I.R.C. § 263 (a).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.263 (a) -2 (1958).
70.
To the extent determined without regard to the income of
the partnership, payments to a partner for services or the
use of capital shall be considered as made to one who is not
a member of the partnership, but only for the purposes of
section 61(a) (relating to gross income) and section 162(a)
(relating to trade or business expenses).
I.R.C. § 707 (c) (prior to enactment of the Act, supra note 1).
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diture for organizational expenses was made to a partner as a
guaranteed payment (determined without regard to partnership
income), then section 707(c) automatically allowed the partnership
a deduction for the payment, even if it were of a nature which
section 263 normally would require to be capitalized. The proponents of this argument pointed to the Senate report on section
707(c) for support:
Subsection (c) provides a rule with respect to guaranteed payments to members of a partnership. A partner who renders
services to the partnership for a fixed salary, payable without
regard to partnership income, shall be treated, to the extent of
such amount, as one who is not a partner, and the partnership
shall be allowed a deduction for a business expense .... 71
In F.A. Falconer,72 the court noted this legislative history in
its opinion when it stated: "The legislative history of section 707(c)
reveals that it was specifically intended to require ordinary income
treatment to the partner receiving guaranteed salary payments and
to give a deduction at the partnership level. '73 Falconer dealt with
salary payments to a partner for services related to the ordinary
business of the partnership, which diminishes its authority for
deducting organizational expenses under section 707(c). The payment clearly was not subject to section 263, so the court had no
reason to consider the interplay of sections 707 (c) and 263.
Proponents of the argument further pointed to Revenue Ruling
69-180,74 which discussed the character of income to the recipient.
The service noted: "Thus, a guaranteed payment is includable
in gross income of the recipient as ordinary income, and is
deductible by the partnership from its ordinary income as a
business expense. '7 5 Once again, the fact situation considered did
not raise the issue of section 263.
Only one case decided under the 1954 Code has squarely confronted the question of whether section 707(c) overrides section 263
and provides a deduction for the guaranteed payment. In Jackson
E. Cagle, Jr.,70 Cagle, Webster, and Erlich formed a partnership
in 1968 to deal in various types of commercial property. The
partnership agreement provided that Erlich would be paid $110,000
for his services rendered pursuant to a management agreement. Of
71. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 387 reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CONG. &AD. NEWS 4785, 5029 (emphasis added).
72. 40 T.C. 1011 (1963).

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 1015.
1969-1 C.B. 183.
Id.
63 T.C. 85 (1974).
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the $110,000, $90,000 was to be paid in 1968. The court noted that
the services rendered by Erlich included a feasibility study, work
with architects and contractors with regard to coordinating the
construction of an office-showroom development, and arranging
financing for the project. The court found that the payments were
of the type that section 263 required to be capitalized. It then considered whether section 707(c) allowed those payments to be
deducted, regardless of section 263. The court concluded that the
intent behind section 707(c) precluded a partnership from circumventing section 263, and it held that a section 707(c) guaranteed
payment is subject to the capitalization requirements of section 263.
The only inference from the committee reports 77 found by the
court indicated that the deduction was to be tested at the partnership rather than at the partner level.7 8 The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court's decision,7 9 noting that there was no intent to give
partnerships a deduction not given to other taxpayers.
[B]ut we view it as most improbable (and we find no indication
to this effect) that Congress intended to provide deductions to a
partnership not permitted any other taxpayer. It is more reasonable to conclude that a guaranteed payment to a partner should
be treated the same as if it had been made to a non-partner.
• .. [I]f a payment made to a partner wQuld be a capital expenditure under Section 263(a) if made to a non-partner, then
such payment should not receive different treatment because
made to a partner .... 80
After the Cagle decision in the Tax Court, but prior to its affirmance by the Fifth Circuit, the Internal Revenue Service issued
Revenue Ruling 75-214.8' In the facts of this ruling, a limited
partnership agreement provided that the general partner was
responsible for all matters pertaining to the organization of the
partnership and the sale of limited partnership interests. For this
service he was paid an amount stipulated by the agreement. The
ruling, referring to Cagle, held that section 707 (c) did not automatically allow the partnership to deduct the payment. Instead, section
263 required that it be capitalized in this instance. Thus, prior to
the Act, the Service's position on this issue was clear, and the Fifth
Circuit agreed.
Tax Reform Act Changes-Guaranteed Payments

B.

Section 213(b) of the Act codifies this interpretation by amend77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See text accompanying note 71 supra.
63 T.C. at 94.
Cagle v. Comm'r, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 414 (footnotes omitted).
1975-1 C.B. 185.
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ing section 707(c). This subsection provides that deduction of such
an item is subject to section 263.82
The changes made by the Act to section 707(c) will limit the
ability of a partnership in the Cagle situation to create a taxable
loss through the use of deductible guaranteed payments to partners.
However, in situations where the partnership has begun its second
or third year of operation, and has substantial gross income, it
might be possible to alleviate the impact of the Act. In Edward
8 3
T. Pratt,
the petitioners were the general partners of a limited
partnership which was organized to purchase, develop and operate
a shopping center. The partnership agreement provided that they
were to receive a fee for managerial services equal to five per cent
of gross base rentals received by the partnership and ten per cent
of rents which the partnership received. The amounts were not
paid to the general partners, but were credited to their accounts.
Because the partnership used accrual accounting, it treated the
amounts due the general partners as guaranteed payments under
section 707(c) and took a deduction for the amounts credited. The
general partners were cash basis taxpayers, and did not report any
income from the amounts credited to their accounts, taking the position that the amounts had not been constructively received. The
Commissioner determir~ed that the amounts credited to the general
partners' accounts were not guaranteed payments but were distributions of profit. Thus, the income was reportable whether or not
the partners received any payments. Before the Tax Court, the
petitioners argued that the payments were covered by either section
707 (a) 8 4 or were guaranteed payments as defined by section 707(c).
The court determined that section 707 (c) was not applicable because
the payments were not determined without regard to the income
of the partnership. The court noted that because the payments
were based on a percentage of gross rental income, they should be
82. I.R.C. § 707(c), as amended by Act, supra note 1, § 213(b) reads as
follows:
To the extent determined without regard to the income
of the partnership, payments to a partner for services or the
use of capital shall be considered as made to one who is not
a member of the partnership, but only for the purposes of
section 61(a) (relating to gross income) and, subject to section 263, for purposes of section 162(a) (relating to trade or
business expenses).
83. 64 T.C. 203 (197,5).
84. "If a partner engages in a transaction with a partnership other than
in his capacity as a member of such partnership, the transaction shall,
except as otherwise provided in this section, be considered as occurring
between the partnership and one who is not a partner." I.R.C.
§ 707 (a).
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considered as payments based on income within the meaning of section 707(c).8-5 With regard to the applicability of section 707(a),
the court found that the services to be performed by the general
partners were basic duties imposed upon them by the partnership
agreement. Because the partners performed the services in their
capacities as members of the partnership, section 707(a) was not
applicable. Because neither section 707(a) nor 707(c) applied, the
court looked to partnership tax law prior to the enactment of the
1954 Code to determine the proper treatment of the payments. The
court found that under prior law, the Commissioner's proposed
treatment of the payments was correct. That is, the payments
would be treated as distributive shares of income to the general
partners, and thus includable by them in their individual income
tax returns and not deductible by the partnership.8 6
The important point to be derived from Pratt for tax planning
purposes is that a payment based on a percentage of gross income
will be treated as a distributive share of net income. This can be
illustrated by an example. Assume the ABCD partnership is comprised of partners A, B, C and D each owning a 25 per cent interest in capital and profits and losses. Gross income has been reasonably constant at $200,000 per year, with deductible expenses of
$150,000, leaving $50,000 of taxable net income, which is distributed
at $12,500 each to A, B, C and D. Now assume that the partnership retains A to perform services which all of the partners agree
are worth $20,000 per year. The nature of the services is such that
section 263 would require the payment to be capitalized. Before
Cagle and the Act, the partnership might have structured the
$20,000 annual payment to A as a guaranteed payment under section 707 (c), with the following result:
Gross income
Regular deductions
Income before guaranteed payment
Guaranteed payment to A
Taxable income

$200,000
[150,000]
$ 50,000
E 20,000]
$ 30,000

Each partner would report income on his individual income tax
return as follows:
A
B
C
D
TOTAL
Guaranteed
Payment
$20,000
$20,000
85. 64 T.C. at 210.
86. Id. at 211-12.
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25% of $30,000
taxable
income
TOTAL

7,500
$27,500

$7,500
$7,500

$7,500
$7,500

$7,500
$7,500

After Cagle and the Act, the guaranteed payment
be reportable by A as ordinary income; however it
by the partnership. This results in the following:
Gross income
Regular deductions
Taxable income
The distribution would be:
B
A
Guaranteed
$20,000
Payment
25% of $50,000
taxable
$12,500
$12,500
income
$12,500
$32,500
TOTAL

30,000
50,000

to A would still
is not deductible
$200,000
[150,000]
$ 50,000

C

D

TOTAL

-

-

$20,000

$12,500
$12,500

$12,500
$12,500

$50,000
$70,000

The resulting disadvantage caused by Cagle and the Act is that
because the guaranteed payment to A is not deductible, each partner's taxable income is increased by $5,000 (25 per cent of the
nondeductible $20,000 payment). Yet, the partnership would have
exactly the same amount of cash available for distribution.
87
If the
In this situation, the Pratt case may prove useful.
partnership
the
stable,
relatively
is
income
gross
partnership's
agreement could provide that partner A will receive as his distributive share of taxable income ten per cent of gross income
and 25 per cent of the remaining taxable income. B, C and D
would each receive 25 per cent of the taxable income remaining
after A is allocated taxable income equal to ten per cent of gross
income. Under Pratt,A's ten per cent of gross income would not
be a section 707(c) guaranteed payment. The partnership agreement should specify the duties A will perform for his additional
payment. This should result in the inapplicability of section 707 (a)
under Pratt,because A would be performing services in his capacity
as a partner. If neither section 707(a) nor 707(c) applies, Pratt
provides that the additional payment of A of ten per cent of gross
income would be treated as a distributive share of net income. The
result should be as follows:
87. This approach is developed in Serton & Charyk, Does the recent Pratt
case provide a method of insuring guaranteed payment deductions?,
43 J. TAx. 66 (1975).
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Gross income
Deductions
Taxable income

$200,000
[150,000]
$ 50,000
A

B

C

D

TOTAL

10% of gross
income (10%
x $200,000)

$20,000

25% of taxable
income remaining
(50,000 20,000)
$ 7,500
TOTAL
$27,500

$20,000

$7,500
$7,500

$7,500
$7,500

$7,500
$7500

$30,000
$50,000

The result is identical to the result achieved by treating a guaranteed payment as a deduction. This approach may be of limited
utility because the typical partnership will make these organizational payments in its first year. Normally, the partnership would
not have taxable income at that time. In order to create the same
effect as the guaranteed payment, the partnership has to have
reasonably stable gross income and probably must have taxable
income greater than the guaranteed payment. This situation might
exist where a partnership is profitable and decides to undertake
a new project. Under Cagle, the partnership must capitalize payments to a partner to do the feasibility study and generally get
the project underway. However, the partnership may be able to
compensate the partner doing the work by the procedure described
above and effectively circumvent Cagle and the Tax Reform Act.
The Service may argue that payments based on gross income
are guaranteed payments under section 707 (c). If the partnership
agreement is amended annually to change the percentage of gross
income allocated to one partner as the partnership estimates its
gross income for each year, the Service may argue that in substance,
a guaranteed payment is being made. Even if the Service prevails
in this argument, the taxpayers would be no worse off by having
tried the Pratt approach than by having treated the payment as
a nondeductible guaranteed payment in the first place.
If the taxable income of the partnership is less than the
percentage of gross income to be allocated to the partner, the situation is more complex. Using the same facts as in the examples,
assume that the partnership's deductions are $190,000, leaving taxable income of $10,000. The allocation to A of ten per cent of gross
income calls for A to receive the first $20,000 of taxable income,
but taxable income is only $10,000,
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In Augustine M. Lloyd,88 salary payments to partners in excess
of partnership taxable income were treated as coming pro rata from
the capital accounts of all partners. To the extent that the payment came from the other partners' capital accounts, it was taxable
to the partner who received it, and the partners whose capital
accounts were charged received a deduction. To the extent that
the payment was deemed to come from the recipient's own capital
account, it was treated as a tax free return of capital. "" The salary
payments in Lloyd were not based on a percentage of income, and
section 707(c) would apparently have been applicable had it been
in the Code at that time.
A section 707(c) guaranteed payment is clearly taxable to the
recipient even if it exceeds partnership taxable income. If the payment is not covered by section 707 (a) or 707(c), as in Lloyd, it is
uncertain whether the Lloyd rationale would apply to tax partner
A on the full $20,000 or on that portion only of the $20,000 traceable to both partnership taxable income and the capital accounts
of B, C and D.
Of course, the partnership agreement could provide that the
entire $10,000 excess would be treated as a draw on A's capital
account. Suppose the agreement provided that in the event A had
less than $10,000 in his capital account, a debt would be created
from him to the partnership. In such a case, A should only be
taxed on the partnership's $10,000 of taxable income because he is
really only receiving $10,000 for his services. In order for A to be
in the same economic position as if the $20,000 were a guaranteed
payment, the agreement must provide that the $10,000 payment to
A in excess of partnership taxable income is charged to each partner's capital account in the loss sharing ratio. If a guaranteed payment created a $10,000 loss, A's capital account would be charged
with 25 per cent of the loss, so he would economically receive
$17,500. In the example, A receives $20,000 (.10 x $200,000) but,
$2,500 of the ten per cent is charged to his capital account. Thus
the accounting reflects the economic benefit of $17,500 and it would
be completely logical to tax A on the $17,500.
If B, C and D are also allowed a deduction for the depletion
of their capital accounts in the case where the payment to A exceeds
the partnership's taxable income, as in Lloyd, it would be possible
to circumvent Cagle and the Act even if the gross income allocation
to A exceeds the partnership's taxable income. This can be seen
88. 15 B.T.A. 82 (1929).
89. Id. at 88.
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by following the example through. Before Cagle and the Act, a
guaranteed payment in excess of taxable income before the payment would have the following effect:
$200,000
Gross income
Net income before guaranteed payment

[150,000]
10,000

Guaranteed payment
Taxable loss

[$10,000]

Regular deductions

A

Guaranteed
$20,000
payment
25% of taxable
loss
TOTAL

[20,000]
C

B
-

[ 2,500]

[$2,500]

[$2,50 0]

$17,500

[$2,500]

[$2,50 0]

D

TOTAL

-

$20,000

[$2,500]
[$2,500]

[10,000]
$10,000

Cagle and the Act disallow the deduction of the guaranteed
payment with the result that each partner's income would increase
by $5,000. Using the theory of Pratt and Lloyd, with the partnership agreement providing that to the extent that the ten per cent
of gross income allocated to A exceeds taxable income, such excess
will be charged to the partners' capital accounts in their loss sharing
ratio, and the following result would occur:
$200,000
[190,000]

Gross income
Deductions
Taxable income

$ 10,000
A

Partnership
taxable
income
Income or deduction from

B

$10,000

C
-

D

TOTAL

-

$10,000

[$2,500]
[$2,500]

0
$10,000

charge to
capital
accounts of
7,500
B, C and D
$17,500
TOTAL

[$2,500]
[$2,500]

[$2,500]
[$2,500]

In either instance, with a deductible guaranteed payment, or
with the Pratt allocation and the application of Lloyd, the results
are identical as to money received, taxable income or loss reported,
and charges to capital accounts.
In this situation, it is unlikely that B, C and D will be given
deductions for the charges to their capital accounts. To follow
Lloyd would clearly violate the purpose of Congress in amending
section 707(c). Even if Lloyd cannot be used to create losses for
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B, C and D, it still should be possible to allocate any taxable income
to A so B, C and D report no income or loss.
C.

Tax Reform Act Changes-Organization
and Syndication Fees

Section 213(b) of the Act added a new Code section, section
70990 to clarify the treatment of organizational expenses of partnerships in general. Section 709 (a) provides the general rule that
amounts paid or incurred to organize a partnership or to promote
the sale of an interest in a partnership are not deductible. Section
709 (b) provides that the partnership may elect to amortize organizational costs ratably over a period of not less than sixty months.
Thus, this section is similar in result to section 248. 91 The standards which must be met in order for the expenditure to be subject
to amortization are similar to those specified in section 248. 9 2 One
difference between these sections is that under section 709, if the
partnership is liquidated within sixty months of formation, any
unamortized organizational costs may be deducted to the extent
allowed by section 165. 9 3 Neither section 248 nor the regulations
90. TREATMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND SYNDICATION FEES.

(a) GENERAL RULE.-Except as provided in subsection (b),
no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter to the partnership or to any partner for any amounts paid or incurred
to organize a partnership or to promote the sale of (or to
sell) an interest in such partnership.
(b) AMORTIZATION OF ORGANIZATION FEES.(1) DEDUCTION. Amounts paid or incurred to organize a partnership may, at the election of the partnership (made in accordance with regulations prescribed by
the Secretary), be treated as deferred expenses. Such
deferred expenses shall be allowed as a deduction ratably
over such period of not less than 60 months as may be
selected by the partnership (beginning with the month in
which the partnership begins business), or if the partnership is liquidated before the end of such 60-month period,
such deferred expenses (to the extent not deducted under
this section) may be deducted to the extent provided in
section 165.
(2)

ORGANIZATIONAL EXPENSES DEFINED.-The

organiza-

tional expenses to which paragraph (1) applies, are expenditures whichship;(A) are incident to the creation of the partner(B) are chargeable to capital account; and
(C) are of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of a partnership having an ascertainable life, would be amortized over such life.

I.R.C. § 709, as enacted by Act, supra note 1, § 213 (b).
91. See note 66 supra.

92. See I.R.C. §§ 709 (b) (2), 248(b).
93. I.R.C. § 709(b) (1), as enacted by Act, supra note 1, § 213(b). Section
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under it contain a comparable provision; however, case law has
allowed a corporation 94
to deduct unamortized organizational expenses upon liquidation.
The House version of this section contained only the provision
of section 709(a) which disallows the deduction. 95 No amortization of the organizational expenses would have been allowed. The
House took the position that the provision merely declared and
clarified existing law.9 6 Therefore, its version applied to all years
under the 1954 Code. The Senate added section 709(b) which
allowed the amortization of organizational costs. 9 7 The Senate
report stated that the provision disallowing deductions would apply
to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975, but the provision allowing amortization of organizational costs would apply
only to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1976.98 The
Senate Bill, however, provided that all of the partnership changes
would be applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31,
1975. 99 The Conference Committee changed the Act to make it
conform with the Senate report. Thus, organizational expenses can
be amortized under section 709(b) only if they were incurred in
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1976.100
It appears as though 1976 was a very bad year for a partnership to incur organizational expenses. Section 709(a) disallows
deductions for such expenditures incurred in 1976, and section
709(b) allows amortization only of those expenditures incurred
after 1976. Therefore, 1976 expenditures can be neither deducted
nor amortized.
The Senate report stated that expenses connected with the
issuing and marketing of interests in a partnership, such as commissions, professional fees, and printing costs, are not subject to
the sixty month amortization rule. By analogy to the cases dealing
165 governs the deductibility of losses in general. Section 165 (c) provides that an individual can deduct losses incurred in a trade or business or in any transaction entered into for profit. Thus, it appears
as though deductions passed through to partners under § 709 (b) (1)
upon the liquidation of a partnership will usually be deductible by
the partner.
94. Malta Temple Assoc., 16 B.T.A. 409 (1929); Kingsford Co., 41 T.C. 646
(1964); Liquidating Co., 33 B.T.A. 1173 (1936).
95. HouSE BILL, supranote 17, § 210 (b).

96. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 122.
97. SENATE BILL, supra note 19, § 210(b).
98. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 94-95.
99. SENATE BILL, supra note 19, § 210 (e).
100. Act, supra note 1, § 213(f). See CONFERENCE
at 421.

REPORT,

supra note 3,
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with corporations,' 0 1 these expenses should be offset upon liquidation of the partnership.
V.

ADDITIONAL FIRST YEAR DEPRECIATION

A. Prior Law
Section 213 (a) of the Tax Reform Act changes present law with
respect to the amount of property subject to additional first year
depreciation which a partnership may pass through to its partners.
Section 179102 provides that a taxpayer may elect to take 20 per
cent of the cost basis as depreciation in the year qualifying property
is acquired, in addition to normal depreciation on the remaining
basis. The amount of property subject to additional first year
depreciation in any year is $10,000 per taxpayer or $20,000 on a joint
return. 10 3 Qualifying property is described as tangible, personal
property of a character such that it is subject to a depreciation
allowance under section 167 and having a useful life 0of
six years
4
or more at the time the taxpayer acquires the property.
To illustrate the operation of section 179, assume individual A
is engaged in a trade or business. Assume further that A buys
an asset for $20,000 on January 1, 1977, which qualifies for additional first year depreciation under section 179 (d) to use in his trade
or business. The asset has a useful life of ten years with no salvage
value. A is a calendar year taxpayer and elects to take additional
first year depreciation. If A is unmarried or married but filing
a separate return, he can take additional depreciation on $10,000
of qualifying property. Thus, he could take $2,000 additional first
year depreciation. Under section 179(d) (8), A reduces his basis by
the additional depreciation before taking regular depreciation.
Thus, his remaining depreciable basis is $18,000. If he uses straight
line depreciation he takes $1,800 regular depreciation for 1977. His
total 1977 depreciation deduction for the new asset is $3,800, or
$2,000 of additional first year depreciation apd $1,800 regular
depreciation. If A files a joint return, he can take additional first
year depreciation on the full $20,000 and his additional first year
depreciation would be $4,000. The remaining depreciable basis
would be $16,000 and regular straight line depreciation for 1977
would be $1,600. Therefore, his total deduction for depreciation
in 1977 would be $5,600.
101. See note 92 supra.
102. I.R.C. § 179(a).
103. I.R.C. § 179(b).
104. I.R.C. § 179(d) (1).
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Prior to the Act, the election under section 179 for qualifying
property purchased by a partnership was made at the partnership
level. However, the application of section 179 was at the partner
level. 10 5 Thus, the cost of section 179 property which a partnership could pass through to its partners was limited only by the
number of its partners. Assume a partnership has ten partners,
each of whom has a ten per cent interest in capital and profits.
Ten per cent of each partnership distributive item is allocated to
each partner. Each partner is married and files a joint return to
his/her spouse. The partnership is in the business of purchasing
machinery and equipment and leasing it to other businesses. On
January 1, 1977, the partnership purchases a piece of equipment
for $200,000 which qualifies under section 179(d) for additional first
year depreciation. The equipment has a ten year useful life and
no salvage value. The partnership elects to take additional first
year depreciation and to take regular depreciation on the 200 per
cent declining balance method. 0 6 The regulations provide that
the cost of property subject to additional first year depreciation
is distributed to partners in the same manner as are depreciation
deductions, 10 7 which in this case would be ten percent to each
partner. Under prior law, the partnership could pass up to $20,000
of the cost of the property to each partner. In this partnership, each partner would receive ten per cent of $200,000 or the
full $20,000 allowable on a joint return. Those partners and
spouses who had not purchased other qualifying property in 1977
could deduct $4,000 of additional first year depreciation on their
return. Those partners and spouses who had purchased other
qualifying property would still be limited to a $4,000 deduction. 10 s
If a partner cannot use the full amount of qualifying property cost
distributed by the partnership because he has purchased other
qualifying property, the partnership must, nevertheless, reduce the
basis of the property by the full amount which all partners could
have used had they not purchased any other qualifying property.' 9 In the example an aggregate of $40,000 additional first
year depreciation could be taken by the partners with respect to
the equipment purchased if none of them had made other purchases
of qualifying property. In any event, the equipment basis is
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(d) (1960).
106. Two hundred per cent declining balance depreciation is authorized by
§ 167 (b) (2). Section 167 (c) permits its use on tangible personal property having a useful life of three years or more.
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(d) (1960).
108. Id.

109. Id.
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reduced to $160,000 and regular depreciation is computed on that
amount. In this case, 200 per cent declining balance depreciation
would be $32,000, or $3,200 per partner. Each partner's joint return
could show a maximum depreciation deduction of $7,200, with
respect to the equipment purchased.
The tax shelter possibility is apparent. If each partner contributed $4,000 to the partnership, and the partnership borrowed
$160,000 to buy the equipment, each partner would receive a $7,200
deduction for a $4,000 investment. If a partner's incremental tax
bracket is near 55 per cent, the $7,200 deduction would reduce his
tax liability by $4,000 and he would recoup his entire investment
in the first year. If the partner's tax bracket is 70 per cent, the
$7,200 deduction reduces his tax liability by $5,040, which returns
to him $1,040 in excess of his investment in the first year.
B.

Tax Reform Act Changes

Congress originally enacted section 179 as an aid to small
business, not to increase the deductions of a tax shelter.110 Thus,
section 213(a) of the Act amends section 179 to impose a $10,000
cost limit on qualifying property at the partnership level."'
Therefore, all partners of a partnership could in the aggregate take
a $2,000 additional first year depreciation deduction. In the example, each partner would receive a deduction of $200 rather than
$4,000. The equipment's remaining depreciable basis would be
$198,000 and regular depreciation under the 200 per cent declining
balance method would be $39,600, or $3,960 per partner. Each
partner's depreciation deduction has been reduced from $7,200 to
$4,160 ($3,960 + $200).
This provision was enacted exactly as it appeared in the House
Bill, and is effective for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1975.
VI. NON-RECOURSE DEBT
A.

Prior Law

The Act also changes the use of nonrecourse liabilities to provide
additional basis for a partner's interest which has previously operated to increase the amount of partnership loss which could be
110. SENATE REPORT,supra note 3, at 92.
111. Act, supra note 1, § 213(a) redesignates § 179(d) (8) as § 179(d) (9)
and adds the following new provision as § 179 (d)(8). "DOLLAR LIMITATION IN CASE OF PARTNERSHIPS.-In

the case of a partnership, the dol-

lar limitation contained in the first sentence of subsection (b) shall
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passed through to the partners for deduction on their individual
income tax returns. 1 12 Section 722 provides that a partner's basis
in his partnership interest equals the amount of money and the
adjusted basis of the property which he contributed to the partnership. Section 752 (a) provides that an increase in a partner's share
of partnership liabilities shall be treated as a contribution of money
by that partner to the partnership. Sections 722 and 752(a) thus
combine to give a partner basis for his share of the partnership's
113
liabilities. With respect to a limited partner, the regulations
provide that his share of partnership liabilities shall not exceed the
difference between his actual contribution to the partnership and
the amount which the limited partnership agreement obligates him
to contribute. An exception is made where no partner has any personal liability with respect to the partnership liability. In that case,
all partners, including limited partners, will share the liability for
basis purposes in the same proportion they share profits. It is this
rule which has made a tax shelter limited partnership possible.
Assume a partnership has a general partner and nine limited
partners each with a ten per cent interest in capital and profits
and losses. Each partner contributes $10,000 to the partnership for
total contributed capital of $100,000. If the partnership is able to
borrow $900,000 on a nonrecourse basis (such as a loan secured only
by a mortgage on real property), each partner shares in the*$900,000
for determining his basis in the same ratio as he shares profits,
or ten per cent giving him a basis of $100,000. Thus, every limited
partner has contributed $10,000 and has no future liability whatsoever to the partnership or its creditors, but he would be allowed
to deduct up to $100,000 in losses from the partnership because the
basis of his interest is $100,000.
B.

Tax Reform Act Changes

Congress responded to this perceived abuse by enacting Act
section 213(e). This new section amends section 704(d) and provides that for purposes of section 704(d), the adjusted basis of any
partner's interest in the partnership shall not include any portion
of any liability with respect to which the partner has no personal
liability. Because section 704(d) allows deductions for losses only
apply with respect to the partnership and with respect to each partner." The dollar limitation of subsection (b)is $10,000.
112. I.R.C. § 704 (d) provides that a partner's distributive share of partnership losses is allowable only to the extent of the partner's adjusted
basis in his partnership interest at the end of the partnership year
in which the loss occurred.
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).

334

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 2 (1977)

to the extent of basis, the amendment prevents the partners in the
previous example from deducting losses in excess of their $10,000
contribution. Because no partner is personally liable on the loan,
section 704(d), as amended, precludes any partner from including
any portion of the $900,000 in the basis of his interest, thereby limiting aggregate basis for purposes of section 704(d) to $100,000 or
$10,000 per partner.
Section 704(d) contains two provisions which include the application of the new rule. The first exclusion relates to partnership
activity covered by new Code section 465,' 14 the "at risk" provision. A comprehensive analysis of section 465 is beyond the scope
of this article. In general, the rule limits losses incurred in certain
activities to the amount the taxpayer has "at risk" and applies to
all taxpayers except corporations which are neither personal holding companies nor subchapter S corporations. 1' 5
A taxpayer is at risk with respect to money and the adjusted
basis of property he has contributed to the activity. 116 He is also
at risk on money borrowed with respect to an activity if he is personally liable for repayment or if he has pledged property as
security for the loan. The property pledged can neither be used
in the activity nor financed through a loan secured by other property which the taxpayer has contributed to the activity. 1 7 The
section 465 at risk rule applies to four types of activities: (1) holding, producing, or distributing motion picture films or video tapes;
(2) farming; (3) leasing of section 1245 property; and (4) exploring
for or exploiting oil and gas resources. Under the terms of section
704(d), a partnership engaged in any one of these four activities
is subject to section 465 rather than section 704(d) with respect to
that activity. The conference report, however, stated that rules
similar to those of section 465 should be applied to section 704(d)
to determine if a partner has personal liability with respect to a
partnership liability."" Thus, it appears as though the same standards would apply both to section 465 and section 704(d) fact patterns. The conference report further indicated that if a partnership
is involved in one of the four activities covered by section 465 and
one or more other activities, both sections 465 and 704(d) apply." 9
This means that partnerships will have to account for both their
liabilities and their partners' contributions by activity. Any part114. Act, supra note 1, § 204(a).
115. I.R.C. § 465(a), as enacted by Act, supra note 1, § 204(a).

116. I.R.C. § 465(b), as enacted by Act, supra note 1, § 204(a).
117. Id.
118.

CONFERENcE REPORT, supra note 3, at 423.

119. Id.

PARTNERSHIP TAX

•335

nership whose principal activity is investing in real property other
than mineral property is also specifically exempted from the new
basis rule of section 704(d). The conference report contained no
further explanation of this provision. Presumably, regulations will
be issued to define what constitutes a principal activity. Prior to
theissuance of regulations, a taxpayer could argue that a partnership's principal activity could be determined by reference to a
variety of factors including gross income, net income, or assets,
depending on which criteria were most favorable.
It is very important to be aware of the scope of section 704(d)
and its new limitation on basis. Section 704(d) limits the loss a
partner may deduct to the basis of his partnership interest. For
purposes of section 704(d) only, a partner's basis does not include
liabilities with respect to which he has no personal liability. When
basis is computed for any other purpose, such as computing gain
or loss upon a sale or liquidation of the interest, the rule of section 752(a) continues to apply, and the regulations 12 0 allow a
limited partner to include nonrecourse debt in his basis. The
limitation of basis applies only for purposes of computing the
partners' allowable loss pass-through.
The provisions of section 213(e) of the Act were introduced in
an amendment of the Senate floor by Senator Haskell. In its
original form, the amendment would have entirely eliminated the
provision in regulations section 1.752-1(e) which allows a limited
partner to include nonrecourse debt in computing the basis of his
partnership interest. 1 2 1 The conference report gives no explanation why the amendment was changed to apply only to section
704(d). The amendment to section 704(d) clearly has the effect
which congress wanted to achieve. It will prevent tax shelter
limited partnerships from using nonrecourse debt to increase the
basis of the interests of the limited partners so as to allow loss
deductions greater than the partners' investments.
It is submitted that the amendment to section 704 could create
additional tax traps which may not have been intended by
Congress. Assume A is a limited partner who contributed $10,000
for a ten per cent interest in capital and profits and losses. The
partnership had borrowed $900,000 on a nonrecourse basis and is
engaged in an activity to which section 704(d), as amended, applies.
A's basis in his interest for any purpose other than the deduction
of losses from the partnership is $100,000 under sections 722 and
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
121. CONFERENCE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 422-23.
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752(a) as defined by regulation section 1.752-1(e). Assume the
partnership incurs a taxable loss for 1977 of $500,000, of which
$50,000 would be allocated to A. Prior to the Act, A could use his
distributive share of the $500,000 loss, or $50,000, as a loss on his
individual income tax return. Section 704(d), as amended, would
limit A's deduction to $10,000. Section 705122 provides that the
basis of A's partnership interest is reduced by losses of the partnership. Thus, A's basis is reduced to $50,000. Had A been allowed
to deduct the full $50,000 of loss allocated to him, a reduction of
his basis by the amount of the loss does not seem to be unfair.
However, where A is allowed to use only $10,000 of the loss, a
$50,000 reduction in basis seems punitive for the following reasons.
A's pro rata share of the liabilities of the partnership after the
loss would still be $90,000. If A abandons his interest in the
partnership on January 1, 1978, his share of partnership liabilities
would be eliminated and, under section 752(b), that would be
1 23
treated as a distribution of cash from the partnership to A.
Section 731 (a) provides that A recognizes gain to the extent that
cash distribution from the partnership exceed his basis in his
partnership interest. Thus, A is treated as having received a $90,000
cash distribution with a $50,000 basis in his interest, resulting in
the recognition of a $40,000 gain. A invested $10,000, deducted a
$10,000 loss, received no money back, yet he must report a $40,000
gain upon the abandonment of his partnership interest.
As a floor amendment, the only report on section 213 (e) of the
Act is the conference report. It seems likely that nobody carefully
thought through the collateral effects of amending only section
704(d). If this result was intended, it is highly unfair, because it
results in the taxpayer paying back tax benefits which he never
received. The problem could be rectified by providing in regulations under section 705 that a partner's basis in his interest is
reduced only by those partnership losses which are allowable on
his individual return under section 704(d). The result in the above
example, assuming such a regulation were in effect, would be that
the partnership loss would reduce A's basis in his interest to $90,000.
If he abandoned the interest, the $90,000 constructive cash distribution under section 752(b) would equal his basis and no gain would
result. This result would be fair because A invested $10,000 and
received no money back. Thus, his economic loss would be $10,000,
and he would have received a $10,000 taxable loss from the
partnership.
122. I.R.C. § 705.
123. See 1 A. WILLIs, supra note 7, at 281-94.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

The Tax Reform Act has closed many channels for tax abuse
through which tax shelter partnerships created and passed taxable
losses to their partners for deduction on individual returns. Although practitioners now may find tax planning for wealthy clients
more difficult, there may be at least one collateral benefit. In the
past, many otherwise prudent investors have pumped capital into
partnerships that were economically unsound, merely because such
an investment would produce a tax loss. Intelligent people often
seem to become irrational when contemplating the payment of
taxes. Consequently, investments were made with little or no
analysis of the economic aspects of the venture. Countless individuals never received a dime back from the partnerships they had
invested in, and many discovered that in later years, earlier tax
benefits had to be paid back with no available cash flow from
the partnership. The blockage of some previous channels for tax
abuse may slow the tendency of investors to throw money into
worthless ventures. A premium now will be placed on finding ventures which are economically sound, and not only those which can
provide tax benefits.
Thomas N. Lawson '77

